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Davis: The Commerce Clause: Border Crossing + Church Burning = Interstat

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: BORDER CROSSING + CHURCH
BURNING = INTERSTATE COMMERCE (A FORMULA FOR
FEDERALIZING COMMON LAW STATE CRIMES)
United States v. Ballinger,395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005)
Cary B. Davis*

Respondent, a practicing Luciferian from Indiana, drove his van south
to Georgia where he set fire to five churches.' One of the arsons resulted
in the death of a volunteer firefighter.2 Respondent pleaded guilty in

federal court to five counts of church arson3 in violation of the Church
Arson Prevention Act (CAPA). 4 Respondent subsequently challenged his
convictions on constitutional grounds, arguing that the CAPA exceeded
Congress's Commerce Clause powers as applied to him. 5 Respondent

argued that the federal commerce power could not reach his acts because
the church burnings-noneconomic, purely intrastate crimes-lacked a
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.6
* For Kelly, my wife and best friend, whose love, support, patience, and integrity inspires
me everyday.
1. United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11 th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Respondent,
accompanied by his girlfriend, left Indiana partly in response to a call to Respondent's home from
an FBI agent. Id. En route to Georgia, Respondent burned three churches in three states. Id. He
burned three more churches on his way back to Indiana. Id. at 1224. Respondent had expressed
hostility toward organized Christianity, and he described the burning ofchurches as his "work" and
his "business." Id. at 1223.
2. The firefighter was killed when the roof of the New Salem United Methodist Church in
Banks County, Georgia collapsed. Id. Three other volunteer firefighters were injured in the blaze.
Id.
3. United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002) (panel opinion).
Respondent received a life sentence on one count in connection with the death of the volunteer
firefighter. Id. at 1268 n.2. Respondent was sentenced to concurrent twenty-year terms on the
remaining four counts. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000). The statute provides, in relevant part, that
"[w]hoever ... intentionally defaces, damages, or destroys any religious real property, because of
the religious character of that property . . . shall be punished." Id. The statute includes a
jurisdictional element requiring the government to prove that the offense "is in or affects interstate
or foreign commerce." Id.
5. Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1224. Respondent advanced his "as-applied" challenge in two
related arguments. First, he argued that the statute exceeded the bounds of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers as applied to his acts. Id. He also pressed a statutory construction argument,
maintaining that the statute should not be read to cover his acts, as Congress did not have the power
to reach his crimes. Id. Additionally, Respondent argued that the CAPA was facially
unconstitutional because Congress does not have the power to proscribe church burning, an
argument the instant court rejected in quick fashion. Id. at 1226.
6. Id. at 1224.
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A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with Respondent, reversing the convictions on the ground that the church
arsons were beyond the reach of Congress's commerce powers and thus
not covered by the CAPA.7 A majority of the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
panel's decision and the court considered Respondent's appeal en banc.8
Affirming Respondent's convictions, the en banc court HELD that, since
Respondent had crossed state lines to commit church arson, his crimes
were properly regulated under Congress's authority to protect the channels
and instrumentalities of commerce. 9
The Constitution created a federal government ofenumerated powers.'°
Powers not vested in Congress by the Constitution remain the province of
the States."i This system of dual sovereignty, known as federalism, creates
a dynamic tension between federal and state power-a tension that reduces
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front and ultimately protects the
liberties of citizens.12 Congress relies on the Commerce Clause 3 as
constitutional authority for a broad range of legislation. This broad power,
however, is not without limits, 4 and the duty to interpret those boundaries
lies with the Supreme Court.' 5 From 1937 to 1995, the Court's Commerce
Clause decisions took a broad view of federal commerce power, triggering
an expansion of federal regulation of conduct and transactions.' 6 Then

7. Ballinger,312 F.3d at 1276.
8. Ballinger,369 F.3d at 1238-39.
9. Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1222.
10. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
12. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.");
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) ("[A] healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.... In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.").
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (noting that the scope of the
Commerce Clause "'may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government"') (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (1937)).
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
16. From the late nineteenth century until 1937, the Court held a narrow view of the
Commerce Clause, regularly striking down legislation as beyond the reach of the federal commerce
power when the targeted activity had only an indirect effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1895) (distinguishing manufacturing from
commerce in holding that a sugar refinery was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act). Then, for
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States v. Lopez, a case that
came the Court's landmark decision in United
17
quo.
status
the
through
sent shockwaves
Lopez involved a facial attack on the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act (GFSZA)' 8 by a twelfth-grader who was charged, under the statute,
with possession of a gun on campus.' 9 Striking down a piece of Commerce
Clause legislation for the first time in nearly sixty years, a divided Court
held that Congress's attempt to criminalize mere possession of a firearm
at a school exceeded the bounds of federal commerce power. 20 The Court
began by summarizing nearly two centuries of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, outlining three broad categories under which Congress may
regulate commerce. 2 ' First, Congress may regulate the channels of
interstate commerce.22 Second, Congress may "regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities.,,2' Finally, Congress may regulate those activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.24
Finding that the first two prongs did not apply to the GFSZA,25 the
nearly sixty years following Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act as applied to a far-flung steel-producing company), the Court's
deferential approach to Commerce Clause legislation resulted in a broad expansion of federal
regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (characterizing the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence afterJones & LaughlinSteel Corp.as providing Congress
"considerably greater latitude"). The Court's attitude toward the Commerce Clause during this era
led Judge Alex Kozinski to refer to the Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-youfeel-like Clause." Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 5 (1995).
17. See Lopez,514 U.S. at 567-68; see also Alistair E.Newbern, Comment, Good Cop,Bad
Cop: Federal Prosecution ofState-Legalized Medical Marijuana After United States v. Lopez, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1575, 1607-08 (2000) (describing the reaction to Lopez in the courts and the academic
community).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988) (criminalizing knowing possession ofa firearm
in a school zone).
19. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
20. Id.at 551, 567-68. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the five-member
majority, which also included Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id.at 550.
21. Id.at 558-59.
22. Id.at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
23. Id.(citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
24. Id.at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
25. The Court offered little guidance for future application of the first two prongs. The Court
stated only that neither prong provided authority for the GFSZA because criminalizing gun
possession in school has nothing to do with regulating the use of or protecting the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Id.at 559. For an argument that the three Lopez prongs
should be shelved in favor of a doctrine that asks simply whether there is some reason the federal
government must be able to regulate a particular activity or some reason the matter cannot be left
to the states, see generally Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power
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Court analyzed the statute under the substantial commercial effect prong.26
In striking down the GFSZA, the Court cited a number of problems with
the statute,27 but it indicated that the noneconomic nature of gun
possession was the fatal flaw. 8 The Court also rejected the Government's
argument that Congress has the power to regulate noneconomic, intrastate
activity when the activity, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. 29 Recognizing that the Court's prior Commerce
Clause opinions suggested a possible expansion of federal power, the
Court declined the invitation to open that door.3" To do so, the Court
stated, would be tantamount to giving Congress virtually plenary power to
legislate in areas historically reserved to the states-family law, education,
and criminal law, for example.3 Thus, the Court's rationale for shaking up
the status quo and calling a halt to the expansion of the federal commerce
power was rooted in the notion that federalism values must be protected.32
In United States v. Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the Lopez
commitment to federalism and added another layer of restriction on
Congress's commerce power.33 In Morrison, the Court held
unconstitutional the civil remedy portion of the Violence Against Women
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995).
26. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
27. In addition to the noneconomic nature of gun possession, the Court identified the
following factors as problematic: the lack of ajurisdictional element ensuring a nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce; the lack of congressional findings setting forth a
connection to interstate commerce; the lack of a connection to a national regulatory scheme whose
efficacy would be undermined if Congress could not reach the activity; and the fact that the statute
sought to regulate activity that traditionally was within the purview of the states. Id. at 561-68.
Scholars have criticized the Lopez Court for failing to offer guidance on how to apply these factors
to future cases. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The
New Commerce Clause JurisprudenceEncounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1258
(2003) (faulting Lopez for not indicating which factor was fatal to the statute, and for not suggesting
how each factor should be weighted).
28. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61, 567.
29. Id. at 563-68.
30. Id. at 567.
31. Id. at 564. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, asserted that, under principles of
federalism, states have a vital role in serving as "laboratories for experimentation." Id. at 581
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The GFSZA, however, would strip states of that role. Id. at 583.
Moreover, were the federal government to take over regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, the boundaries between federal and state authority would become blurred and "political
responsibility would become illusory." Id. at 577.
32. The majority opinion concluded by stating that failure to draw the line on federal
commerce power would mean "that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local." Id. at 567-68.
33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (5-4 decision). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion in Lopez, again wrote the opinion for the majority in
Morrison.Id. at 600. As in Lopez, the justices split along ideological lines, with Justices Kennedy,
O'Conner, Scalia, and Thomas joining the majority opinion. Id.
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Act (VAWA),34 which created a private right of action for female victims

of violence.35 Analyzing the case under the substantial commercial effect
prong, the Court began by citing Lopez for the proposition that federal
regulation of intrastate conduct is presumptively invalid unless the targeted
conduct is economic in nature.3 6 The Court also added gloss to the
channels and instrumentalities prongs by stating that the power to regulate
violence
intrastate violence is left exclusively to the states unless that 37
commerce.
interstate
of
instrumentalities
or
channels
targets the
The key question in Morrison was whether congressional findings
about the effects of the targeted activity on interstate commerce, a missing
ingredient in Lopez, could save an otherwise suspect statute from judicial
invalidation.38 The Court said no.39 The Court emphasized that simply
because Congress concludes that "'a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. "" According
to the Court, whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question.4 ' Invoking the
strong federalism themes of Lopez, the Court refused to defer to
Congress's findings when the result of such deference would be to convert
the Commerce Clause into a general police power.42
In United States v. Jones,43 the Court again relied heavily on the
federalism principles of Lopez in narrowly construing the reach of the
federal omnibus arson statute." Unlike the statutes involved in Lopez and
34. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995). The statute was passed pursuant to both Congress's Commerce
Clause powers and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
35. Id. at 601-02. The plaintiff,a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, brought suit under
the statute, alleging she had been raped by two football players. Id. at 602-03. The Court struck
down the statute as violative of both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
627.
36. Id. at 610-11. The Court stated that "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case." Id. at 610. The
Court further stated that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature." Id. at 613.
37. Id. at 618. The Court continued: "Indeed, we can think ofno better example of the police
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." Id.
38. See id.at 614-15. In enacting the VAWA, Congress made numerous findings regarding
the effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce-effects that included deterring
travel and employment, diminishing national productivity, and increasing medical costs. Id. at 615
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839).
39. Id. at 614.
40. Id. The Court quoted Lopez as support for this proposition. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring)).
42. Id. at 615; see also Denning & Reynolds, supra note 27, at 1258-60.
43. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
44. Id. at 851, 857-58. The Court announced the decision in Jones one week after it decided
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Morrison, the federal arson statute contained a jurisdictional hook,
requiring the government to prove that the damaged property was "used
in interstate ...commerce or in any activity affecting interstate .. .
' Reversing petitioner's arson conviction, a unanimous
commerce." 45
46
Court held that the statute could not be read to apply to an arsonist who
bums a residential dwelling.47 The Court opted for a narrow interpretation
of the statute in order to avoid the dubious constitutional conclusion that
residential arson--"'traditionally local criminal conduct"'-is "'a matter
for federal enforcement"' under the Commerce Clause.48 The Court
49
reasoned that if such an attenuated connection to interstate commerce
could serve as the basis for federal regulation of the "paradigmatic
common-law state crime" of arson, then "hardly a building in the land
would fall outside the federal statute's domain."5 Thus, the Court's
analysis in interpreting the statute was guided by the federalism principles
brought to the fore in Lopez.51
In affirming Respondent's convictions for church arson," the instant
court applied neither the substantial commercial effect test of Lopez and
Morrison, nor the narrow interpretative approach of Jones. Instead, the
Morrison.

45. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. IV 1994). The statute makes "damaging or destroying, by
means of fire or an explosive, any... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce a federal crime." Id.
46. Justice Ginsburg, who dissented in both Lopez and Morrison, wrote the opinion of the
Court.
47. Jones, 529 U.S. at 850-52, 857-59.
48. Id.at 857-59 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,350 (1971)). The Court relied
on the interpretive rule adopted in UnitedStates ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909), that "'where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one
ofwhich grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions
are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.'" Jones, 529 U.S. at 857.
49. The government argued that the dwelling in question in Jones was used in at least three
activit[ies] affecting commerce: (1) the homeowner used the dwelling as collateral to obtain and
secure a mortgage from an out-of-state lender; (2) the homeowner obtained an out-of-state
insurance policy on the home; and (3) the homeowner received natural gas from out-of-state
sources. Jones, 529 U.S. at 855 (quoting Brief for the United States at 19-23 (No. 99-5739)).
50. Id. at 857-58. Justice Ginsburg continued, "Practically every building in our cities, towns,
and rural areas is constructed with supplies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by
utilities that have an interstate connection, financed or insured by enterprises that do business across
state lines, or bears some other trace of interstate commerce." Id.at 857.
51. Id. The Court stated that "[t]o read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owneroccupied private [dwelling]" would significantly change the federal-state balance. Id. at 858; see
also Thomas Heyward Carter, III, Note, The Devil in U.S. v. Jones: Church Burnings, Federalism,
and a New Look at the Hobbs Act, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1475 (2002) (raising the
possibility that Jones signals a change in the Court's approach to the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and congressional power to regulate crime).
52. United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1227, 1240 (2005) (Marcus, J.). The en banc
court decided the case by a vote often to three. See id. at 1221, 1243.
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instant court relied on the channels and instrumentalities prongs of Lopez
in holding that Congress had the constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause to proscribe Respondent's church arsons.53 The instant
court asserted that there was no need to analyze the case under the
substantial commercial effect prong since Respondent used the channels
(highways) and instrumentalities (Respondent's van) of interstate
commerce to carry out his crimes. 4 The instant court further asserted that
the scope of Congress's authority under the first two Lopez prongs
encompassed the power to prevent the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce from being used to facilitate harmful acts, even when
the proscribed harmful act is consummated outside the flow of
commerce.55 In the instant case, a border crossing was enough to bring
Respondent within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.56
After concluding that Congress could proscribe Respondent's activities,
the instant court addressed the question of whether the text of the CAPA
actually did so." Without mentioning the federalism themes of Lopez or
the narrow interpretation rule ofJones, 8 the instant court gave broad effect
to the jurisdictional hook in the CAPA.59 The instant court held that by
using the words "in or affects interstate . . . commerce" in the
jurisdictional hook, Congress invoked the federal government's full
authority under the Commerce Clause.6' Thus, since Respondent, by
crossing state lines, used the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to carry out his crimes, and since Congress had the power to
53. Id. at 1227-28. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit panel opinion followed Lopez and
Morrison in analyzing the CAPA under the substantial commercial effect test, since the statute
regulated the activity of arson, not the travel to the scene. United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d
1264, 1269 (2002). The panel opinion resolved the case using the narrow interpretation rule of
Jones, concluding that the statute could not be read to reach Respondent's conduct since the
churches in question did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1271-73.
54. Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1227.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1228.
57. Id. at 1230.
58. The majority cited Lopez only for the general proposition that Congress's commerce
powers are limited to three categories and to distinguish the CAPA, which contains ajurisdictional
element, from the statute in Lopez, which did not. Id. at 1225, 1228 n.5, 1235.
59. Id. at 1235, 1240.
60. Id. at 1240. The instant court also pointed to the legislative history of the statute. Id. at
1239-40. As originally enacted, the statute's jurisdictional element required that the government
prove that the defendant, in committing the offense, traveled in interstate commerce or used a
facility or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Id. at 1239 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-346, § 1,
102 Stat. 644 (1988)). The law as amended in 1996 replaced that language with the "in or affects
interstate.., commerce" language. See 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000). The House Report accompanying
the 1996 amendment indicates that Congress intended to broaden the reach of the statute by
mirroring Lopez's articulation of the extent and nature of the commerce power. Ballinger,395 F.3d
at 1240 (citing H.R. REP.No. 104-621, at 10 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1082, 1091).
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regulate such conduct, the instant court concluded that the CAPA reached
Respondent's crimes. 6'
The dissenters 62 criticized the majority's failure to adhere to the
federalism principles central to the holdings in Lopez, Morrison, and
Jones.6 3 Judge Hill argued that, because the CAPA regulates the
noneconomic intrastate activity of church burning, federalism values
should have led the majority to examine Respondent's crimes under the
more restrictive substantial commercial effect prong.' Judge Hill asserted
that Congress's intention that the CAPA reach offenders who use the
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to burn churches
does not mean courts should abandon the judiciary's duty to uphold the
Constitution. 65 Furthermore, Judge Hill argued that by deferring to
congressional intent, the majority glossed over the fact that the CAPA
criminalizes the act of church burning, not the use of the interstate
highway system to reach the church.6 6
The instant court has opened the door to expanded federal enforcement
of noneconomic intrastate crimes by abandoning the federalism tenets
undergirding Lopez and its progeny. The majority's failure to acknowledge

61. Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1228, 1240.
62. Judges Tjoflat, Birch, and Hill each wrote dissenting opinions. See id. at 1243 (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting); id. at 1248 (Birch, J., dissenting); id.at 1253 (Hill, J., dissenting). Judges Tjoflat and
Hill disagreed with the majority's broad statutory interpretation; each would have reversed on the
ground that the statute cannot, consistent with the Commerce Clause, be read to apply to church
arson simply because the arsonist crossed a state line. Id. at 1248 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); id. at 1257
(Hill, J., dissenting). Judge Birch would have reached the constitutional question and invalidated
the CAPA as beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1248 (Birch, J., dissenting).
63. Judge Birch, for example, wrote that
by failing to appreciate the significance of federalism, the majority has
misconstrued the limits of the Commerce Clause and allowed a federal statute to
regulate intrastate noneconomic conduct in an area of law traditionally protected
from federal intrusion. Thus, the majority has burned yet another bridge to our
federalist foundations.
Id. at 1253 (Birch, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1255-56 (Hill, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1295-97
(11 th Cir. 2001) (reversing an arson conviction because the government could not show a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
65. Judge Hill explained, "As Lopez, Morrison, andJones have made clear, no jurisdictional
hook, nor any mantric invocation by Congress of its 'fullest authority under the Commerce Clause'
can establish federal jurisdiction over an intrastate activity that judicial review determines does not
have the constitutionally required substantial effect on interstate commerce." Ballinger,395 F.3d
at 1256-57 (Hill, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1257 (Hill, J., dissenting). Indeed, as Judge Hill pointed out, "numerous federal
statutes... explicitly[] criminalize travel in interstate commerce in order to commit a traditional
common-law crime." Id. at 1254 n.1 (Hill, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss4/5
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the obvious federalism concerns at stake is particularly striking given the
wide-ranging scholarly reaction and predictions of a Commerce Clause
revolution generated by Lopez. 67 Thus, the instant court's silence can be
interpreted to imply that the strong current of federalism underlying the
holdings in Lopez, Morrison, and Jones carried no precedential weight.68
That begs the question of whether those opinions can be limited to their
facts.6 9 If so, judges and federal prosecutors can avoid the constraints of
federalism merely by pointing to neat factual distinctions."0
The instant court's approach thus portends a jurisprudential shift
toward a watered-down Commerce Clause, with the inquiry focusing not
on the activity Congress is seeking to regulate, but rather, on whether
Cungress used the right language.7" Specifically, the instant court has
opened an escape hatch from the restrictive substantial commercial effect
prong by using the channels and instrumentalities prongs to sustain federal
enforcement of noneconomic intrastate activity.72 Moreover, the instant
court's broad interpretation of the CAPA's jurisdictional element signals
a departure from the more judicially-aggressive, narrow interpretation rule
of Jones.7

Under the rationale used in Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, the instant
case would have been decided, and Respondent's convictions reversed,
under the substantial commercial effect prong.74 Morrison indicated that
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activities can only be sustained
when the targeted activity is both economic in nature and has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce." The instant court, however, managed to
maneuver around Morrison'sfederalism constraints by identifying a new

67. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 30 (2001)
(concluding that Lopez signals a federalism revolution); see also Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips,
CommerceByAnother Name: The Impact ofUnited States v. Lopez andUnited States v. Morrison,
68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 609-10 (2001) (characterizing scholarly reaction to Lopez).
68. For an argument that lower courts have been reluctant to take Lopez seriously, even after
Morrison, see Denning & Reynolds, supranote 27, at 1256.
69. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings ofLopez,
or What if the Supreme Court Held a ConstitutionalRevolution andNobody Came?, 2000 WiS. L.
REV. 369, 389-91 (suggesting that federal courts often avoid the federalism constraints of Lopez
by finding factual distinctions, such as a jurisdictional element in a statute).
70. See id.
71. See Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1256-57 (Hill, J., dissenting).
72. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; see also Antony Barone Kolenc, Casenote,
Commerce Clause ChallengesAfter United States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867, 927-29 (1998)
(surveying cases in which federal courts have used the channels and instrumentalities prongs to
uphold legislation).
73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
74. See Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1256-57 (Hill, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1254-55 (Hill, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000)).
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and powerful use for the channels and instrumentalities prongs: to broaden
the scope of a jurisdictional element.76 Under the instant court's approach,
a broadly-worded jurisdictional element that invokes the full commerce
power would allow federal enforcement of any noneconomic intrastate
crime.77 A federal prosecutor would only need to show that the defendant
used a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce to facilitate the
crime-crossing state lines would be sufficient-in order to justify federal
jurisdiction.7"
The implications of this approach were fully displayed in the instant
case. Respondent committed a noneconomic, common-law state crime.79
His acts destroyed local churches, devastated local congregations, and
disrupted local communities.80 The proper venue for exacting justice is a
local state court, where the affected community can observe local
representatives administering local law.8 ' However, the expansive
Commerce Clause regime advanced by the instant court threatens such
local independence.82
Jones provided the instant court with a custom-fit model for resolving
the instant case under the narrow interpretation rule.83 Indeed, the instant
case had much in common with Jones: Both cases involved an arson
prosecution and both statutes contained jurisdictional elements purporting
to invoke the full extent of Congress's commerce powers.84 Under the
Jones narrow interpretation rule, Respondent's church arsons were beyond
the reach of Congress because his crimes did not substantially affect
interstate commerce.8 5 Congress's choice of statutory language is
irrelevant under Jones if federal regulation offends the federalism tenets

76. See id. at 1256-57 (Hill, J., dissenting). For a discussion of how Lopez and Morrison
created a massive loophole by failing to address the channels and instrumentalities prongs, see
Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalismafter Lopez and Morrison:
The Casefor ClosingtheJurisdictional-ElementLoophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1679-80(2002).
77. Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1257 (Hill, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Hill, J., dissenting); see also McGimsey, supra note 76, at 1679-80 (arguing that a
"jurisdictional element.., can be easily satisfied" under the channels and instrumentalities prong
by showing "a simple state-line crossing, however remote in time or purpose").
79. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
80. Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1251 (Birch, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 1251-52 (Birch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1251 n.4 (Birch, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that "[s]tate criminal statutes would have outlawed [Respondent's] conduct in each
of the States in which he committed church arson").
82. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (discussing how
federal encroachment into state matters undermines governmental accountability).
83. See Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1255-56 (Hill, J., dissenting).
84. CompareBallinger, 395 F.3d at 1221-22, 1224, with Jones v. United States, 529 U.S.
848, 850-52 (2000).
85. Ballinger,395 F.3d at 1256-58 (Hill, J., dissenting).
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of Lopez.86 By indicating that a state-line crossing is enough to satisfy a
jurisdictional element, and thus avoiding judicial review of whether the
proscribed act substantially affected commerce, the instant court
significantly departed from Jones.8 7 In so doing, the instant court has
invited further expansion of federal law enforcement into areas
traditionally reposed in the police powers of the states.88
Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, taken cumulatively, unmistakably stand
for the proposition that lower courts must view Commerce Clause
challenges through the lens of federalism, lest the power of the federal
government become limitless. A federal government of enumerated
powers presupposes important roles for the states: to experiment, to make
policy choices about issues of local concern, and to bring government
closer to the people. Thus, the Commerce Clause can be properly
understood as limiting the federal power to activities of national concern:
activities covered by a nationwide regulatory scheme such as terrorism,
transportation, and drug trafficking. These were the types of activities the
Lopez Court clearly had in mind in sketching out the three prongs of
commerce power.89
A substantive interpretation, the proper approach considering how
Morrison and Jones reaffirmed Lopez's themes, focuses on the common
thread running through each prong: the requirement of a meaningful nexus
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Jones is the model
for this approach. A formalistic interpretation, a less preferable but more
popular approach among lower courts, focuses instead on linguistic tools
and minor distinctions between cases.9" For this approach, the instant case
stands as a model. Maybe, as many have suggested, the standards
articulated in Lopez are ambiguous and unworkable and need tidying up.9 '
Until that day comes, the instant court's decision offers a formula for
expanding the power of the federal government at the expense of the
states.

86. Id. at 1255 (Hill, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1256 (Hill, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1257 (Hill, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Reynolds & Denning, supra note 69 (surveying the response to Lopez in
the lower courts).
91. See, e.g., McGimsey, supranote 76, at 1736 (arguing that the Court should clarify the
scope of the channels and instrumentalities prongs).
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